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Abstract 
This paper describes and explains a significant tightening in bank capital regulation in the UK since the 2008 
financial crisis. The banks fiercely resisted the new capital regulations but in a novel theoretical contribution we 
argue that the structural power of business was reduced due to the changing ideas of state leaders, by changing 
institutional arrangements within the state and by wider open politicisation of banking reform.  
 
Introduction 
This paper analyses the battle over bank capital regulation in the aftermath of the 2008 banking crisis 
in a core financial market; the UK. Bank capital is shareholder’s equity, a bank’s own reserves, as well 
as retained earnings. Banks with higher ratios of capital to total assets are more likely to be able to 
withstand significant losses. The banking industry has nevertheless traditionally opposed higher 
capital requirements, arguing that higher capital levels increase costs, depress lending and weaken 
profits. Capital regulation has however increasingly been tightened in the post-crisis era. We argue 
this substantially reflects changes in the structural power of banks and financial institutions as well as 
increased state capacity. Three factors matter here: the changing ideas of policy makers and their 
perception of structural power threats; enhanced state capacity, including bureaucratic capacity and 
insulation in key regulatory agencies, especially the Bank of England; and the wider ‘noisy’ 
politicisation (Culpepper, 2011) of banking reform. 
 We identify three phases of capital regulation in the UK. Prior to 2008 and over a long period 
there was a significant winding-down in capital levels in a major risk shift from the banks to the state 
(Haldane and Piergiorgio. 2009). Post-crisis, amidst intense bank lobbying, capital levels were 
increased, though in the view of some commentators, only moderately, through the Basel III 
negotiations and the subsequent implementation of these rules via the European Union’s Capital 
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Requirements Directive IV. Subsequently, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee (FPC) 
working alongside the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), has in its own words, taken a 
‘conservative and comprehensive view of capital adequacy’ (FPC, 2013a, 5) and significantly tightened 
regulatory constraints to produce one of the world’s toughest standards on capital adequacy, despite 
very substantial opposition from the UK financial industry. This paper seeks to highlight how and 
why such policy tightening has occurred, especially in terms of arguments about the structural power 
of business, and associated arguments about ideational change, state capacity and wider political 
change. 
Our theoretical starting-point in explaining these policy changes is Lindblom’s (1977) classic 
argument that ‘privileged’ business interests wield structural power by virtue of their control over 
key economic resources and the investment and credit processes on which governments and wider 
society depend. Structural power can help explain the government’s caution about capital regulation 
in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis. The banks, at that time, had some success in arguing 
that increasing capital levels would inevitably result in lower lending and that this would jeopardise 
the recovery. But how, in this case, can we account for the subsequent tightening in regulation? Our 
answer is found in rejecting the assumption that structural power is a material reality which arises 
automatically in capitalist societies. Against this, Bell (2012) has argued that ideas, particularly the 
ideas held by state leaders, condition and mediates structural power. We argue that structural power 
has been mediated and policy change facilitated through the way in which expert state elites 
developed and deployed ideas in key political contests, especially in challenging the banks’ 
arguments about capital and lending.  
Our paper also develops new theoretical insights about how structural power is shaped and 
mediated by first arguing that the changing institutional context of state policy makers strengthened 
their hand and second by arguing that the noisy politicisation of banking reform in the wake of the 
2008 crisis also helped embolden policy makers.  
The (variable) Structural Power of Business 
Lindblom (1977) argued that governments and the wider society depend on a strong economy and 
hence in a capitalist economy on the willingness of business to invest and produce. Governments are 
therefore dependent upon business and financiers and typically have strong incentives to cater to 
their needs and demands. 
This form of structural power is not automatic however. As we argue, agents, especially within the 
state, mediate the relationship. For example, not all sectors of business are necessarily privileged. 
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Some sectors may lack resources or be economically weak, or governments might perceive their 
growth as non-essential or even detrimental to overall economic growth. In the case at hand however, 
we argue that there is a strong prima facie case for arguing that the banking industry possesses a 
strong measure of structural power in the sense employed by Lindblom. First, banking and finance 
are a critical sector within the UK economy. On one estimate, banking and finance comprised 8.3 per 
cent of GDP prior to the 2008 crisis, employed 303,000 people in London, generated a £44bn trade 
surplus, attracted £40bn in foreign direct investment and accounted for twenty-five per cent of 
Corporation Tax revenue (CityUK, 2008). Second, banks and other financial institutions provide vital 
credit supplies to households and businesses. The varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 
2001, 28; and Zysman, 1983, 63), argues that businesses in liberal market economies rely primarily on 
equity markets for finance, yet this is no longer true of the United Kingdom. In the early 2000s the 
bond and capital markets together provided around eighty per cent of funds for new business 
investment, but by 2006/7 bank lending had become far more central, providing eighty per cent of 
these funds: a remarkable shift (Pattani, and Vera, 2011, 319). Between 1997 and 2007 UK bank 
lending to non-financial companies grew at a rate of between ten and twenty per cent a year (Hardie 
and Maxfield, 2013, 59). 
There have been a range of additions to and critiques of Lindblom’s original arguments about 
structural power. Some have argued that structural power can be shaped and mediated by the 
economic cycle (Vogel 1989); whilst others argue it can be shaped by institutional dynamics (Hacker 
and Pierson 2002); divisions within the business sector between financial and coalitions of other 
business interests (Pagliari and Young, 2014; Helleiner and Thistlewaite, 2013); collective action 
problems (Woll, 2014) and the structural parameters of economies and exit options for capital 
(Culpepper and Reinke, 2014). On this reasoning, simple structural power accounts are often too 
mechanical and deterministic and cannot account for temporal and/or (as above) for sectoral 
variations in such power. There is a further key problem with Lindblom’s account: it leaves too little 
room for agency. Bell (2012) argues that structural power arguments have largely overlooked the 
importance of the agency of government policy makers and their ideas and how they appraise and 
respond to structural power threats. In contrast to Lindblom (1977), and to Hacker and Pierson (2002, 
277) and others, who argue that the structural power of business is generated ‘independently and 
automatically’ because of micro-decisions about lending or investment taken by business leaders,1 we 
                                                          
1. Following the same line of argument, Dowding (1996, 71) describes business as being 
‘systematically lucky’. Similarly, Hall (1986, 274) sees business power as ‘systemic’ because ‘structural 
incentives already apparent to politicians tend to discourage them from pursuing policies that might 
endanger investment, even in the absence of collective action on the part of capital’. 
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argue that power is not an objective condition but is shaped subjectively and inter-subjectively amidst 
changing relations between business and government which can be mediated by institutional factors 
and by wider political factors, as we show here.  
Although Lindblom is well aware of business agency and lobbying power, his account tends to 
downplay interactions between agency and structure. Lindblom (1977, 190) argues either that 
‘privileged business controls are largely independent of the electoral controls of polyarchy’, or that 
business interests can ‘bend polyarchy to accommodate business controls.’ Neither account is fully 
satisfactory. We argue for stronger connections between agency and structure. In our view, structural 
power is in part ideationally constructed (Bell 2012); an approach which recognizes that ideas, 
language and discourse provide crucial building blocks for establishing meaning and understanding 
and thus of purposeful action in politics and institutional life. What counts in the power equation is 
not just whether business lending or investment is essential for growth in particular cases, but also 
whether state actors believe this to be the case. One reason why the structural power of business varies 
is because government actor’s normative and causal ideas about the value and determinants of 
business investment and credit flows vary.  
Bell (2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014b) thus argue that the ideas held by state leaders and, 
in particular, the way in which they appraise and react to business investment or credit threats, can be 
important in shaping or mediating the structural power of business. Power then does not simply 
shape or dominate ideas, as Lukes (1974), Gaventa (1980) and Foucault (1979) all argue. It is also the 
case that ideas shape power. In this view, structural power must be ‘actualised’ through efforts by 
business leaders to convince policy-makers and perhaps the public more generally about the veracity 
of such power. In a democratic system, business leaders’ arguments about the consequences of state 
regulation can be contested by interest-groups, rival business interests, the media or, as happened in 
this case of capital regulation, by academic and professional economists. Policy debates take place 
against the backdrop of constantly evolving arguments about the likely consequences of acting in 
particular ways and these arguments shape the structural power of business. 
Because structural power is mediated by ideas, it follows that structural forms of power might be 
supported by instrumental forms of business power. As Offe and Wiesenthal (1980:86) have argued, 
business policy preferences and structural power might be ‘exploited and fine-tuned’ through overt 
business lobbying and communication directed at government. In this view, business power is thus a 
product of a relationship between business and government operating through structural and 
instrumental channels. This is not to suggest that we collapse the analytical distinction between the 
two forms of power but only to suggest that the two forms of power can often work together. We are 
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therefore not, as Culpepper (2015: 396) charges, challenging ‘the very utility of the distinction 
between structural power and instrumental power’, but instead simply pointing out how the two can 
run together in the real world.  
There are two further theoretical innovations in this paper. First, we draw upon state capacity 
literature and join this to structural power arguments by arguing that the institutional location and 
capacities of state policymakers are also important. The Bank of England’s institutional resurgence is 
especially important; specifically the clarity of the FPC’s mandate, its relative autonomy, and its 
administrative resources and knowledge capacities. Hence, ideas and state capacities are not separate 
explanatory factors: the Bank of England’s institutional empowerment is reflective of post-crisis 
ideational change and lesson-learning that shaped and promoted institutional change. In this manner 
we show below how changing ideas and the changing institutional contexts of policy makers helped 
empower them in the face of structural power threats.  
Second, Bell and Hindmoor (2014a) have recently explored how the role of voters and wider 
political contestation can impact on structural power dynamics, and this is also the case here. The 
2008 crisis turned the previously insular world of bank regulation into a far more high-profile and 
contested arena. This shift from quiet to noisy politics in the world of banking regulation enhanced 
state capacity and helped empower the Bank. Indeed, the political legitimacy and clout of the banking 
industry was weakened by the way in which public debate about the role and value of banks was 
ignited by the 2008 crisis and then further inflamed by a succession of subsequent banking scandals. 
It is difficult to untangle the relative influences stemming from the ideational, institutional and 
structural power dynamics we explore from the wider impact of politicisation. We simply argue that 
changing ideas and structural power dynamics are highly salient, and that the impetus for reform 
was further supported by the noisy politicisation surrounding the banks, all of which helped further 
embolden and support policy makers. It is possible however to distinguish analytically between ideas 
which helped animate and embolden such actors on the one hand, and growing incentives for action 
on the other, which stemmed not only from ideas but also from the wider context of contestation; one 
which increasingly proved unfavourable to the banks. Ideas and incentives therefore ran together in 
this case. Ideas that proved enlightening and empowering for policymakers were spurred and 
supported by the changing political context. This suggests that Lindblom’s (1977, 190) argument that 
‘privileged business controls are largely independent of the electoral controls of polyarchy’, or that 
business interests can ‘bend polyarchy to accommodate business controls’, firstly, unrealistically 
segregates structural power dynamics from the wider context political context and, secondly, wrongly 
assumes that such contexts can simply be ‘bent’ to suit structural power imperatives. 
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The Dynamics of Capital Regulation 
In the Nineteenth Century, banks in Britain routinely held capital equivalent to around 30% of total 
assets (Haldane, 2011a). Market investors required banks to hold this level of capital to support 
confidence and to ensure liquidity and solvency. Subsequently, average capital levels declined 
dramatically. The Independent Commission on Banking (2011, 128) reports that average capital levels 
of UK banks had fallen to 5.5% of total assets by the late 1970s and that prior to the 2008 crisis they 
had fallen to just 2.5% of total assets. This capital wind-down was facilitated by the state and by the 
Basel accords. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank (BCBS) finalised Basel I in 1988 in 
order to prevent an international regulatory race-to-the bottom and to guarantee minimal capital 
standards in an increasingly internationalized banking system. Yet, in practice, Basel I and its 
successor, Basel II, resulted in a reduction in average capital levels by setting minimal capital levels 
relative to ‘risk-weighted’ rather than total assets and by creating an additional regulatory category of 
tier 2 capital which included undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, hybrid (debt/capital) 
instruments and subordinated debt.  
Bank executives also had a bonus-based incentive to wind down capital levels in order to 
improve their return-on-equity (RoE) by boosting returns and reducing equity. Investors accepted the 
winding down of capital due to the introduction of state-supported deposit insurance and lender of 
last resort functions and because they underestimated the extent of bank balance sheet exposures and 
dependence upon short-term wholesale funding prior to the 2008 crisis (Hindmoor and McConnell: 
2013).  
The crisis, which originated in the US subprime mortgage market, exposed the limitations of 
the Basel regulations. In 2008, the IMF estimated subprime loses at $500bn (Admati and Hellwig 2013, 
60); only a small fraction of overall bank balance sheets (Bernanke, 2012). Yet these losses triggered a 
general financial crisis for two reasons: the losses led investors to question the value of other banking 
assets, and raised questions about the solvency of the largest banks. Suddenly, capital buffers 
mattered: investors knew that low capital levels meant small balance sheet losses could prove fatal. 
Panicked wholesale funding markets began to demand more collateral or higher interest payments to 
roll-over their loans. With costs suddenly rising and profits falling, banks had to repair their balance 
sheets by either raising additional capital or selling existing assets. This logic was played-out over 
several years as first Northern Rock and then Bear Stearns and, finally, Lehman Brothers failed. By 
the time the crisis had been contained in the UK through a Treasury-led recapitalisation, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) calculated total losses experienced by UK-based investment banks to be the 
equivalent of 160% of their capital (Barwell, 2013, 23).  
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Global capital account imbalances, the reengineering of balance sheets away from lending 
toward financial trading, insufficient liquidity and the fragilities of wholesale funding markets, 
inadequate risk-management, the frenetic search for yield in a low interest-rate environment, and a 
myriad of other factors also contributed to the onset of the crisis (see Friedman, 2009; Davies, 2010; 
FCIC, 2011, Bell and Hindmoor, 2015). Yet, in its immediate aftermath, low capital ratios were also 
cited by a number of regulators and politicians as a key cause. The Financial Stability Forum (2008, 
12) criticised the ‘significant weaknesses’ in pre-crisis capital regulation. The UK Chancellor, Alistair 
Darling (2009), said ‘it would have been better if the banks were holding more capital … when the 
crisis hit’. The influential Turner Review (Turner, 2009a, 7) concluded that ‘the quantity and quality of 
overall capital in the global banking system should be increased’. The US Treasury Secretary, 
Timothy Geithner, concluded that: ‘the top three things to get done are capital, capital, capital’ 
(quoted, Howarth and Quaglia, 2013, 333).  
 The banking industry did not directly challenge such views. Instead, it argued that higher 
capital levels in the wake of the crisis would have the effect of reducing lending and prolonging the 
post-crisis recession. The Institute of International Finance (2010), an international bank lobby group, 
published a report purporting to show that a 2% increase in capital levels would reduce cumulative 
economic output by 3.1% in the Eurozone, the US and Japan by 2015 and destroy nine million jobs 
(Lall, 2012, 628). Similarly, the British Bankers Association commissioned PwC to produce a report 
assessing the likely impact of any additional capital regulations on the supply of credit (James, 
forthcoming, 15).The Chief Executive of the British Bankers Association (BBA), Angela Knight (2009), 
maintained that higher capital levels would ‘reduce the ability to use new capital to support lending 
and that will be very important as we start to come out of recession’. A year later, Knight (2010a) 
argued that ‘it is very easy to call for quick timetables’ [to raise minimal capital levels] but that higher 
capital would ‘dramatically impede’ the ‘ability of the industry to finance economic recovery’. Later 
that year, Knight (2010b) held that ‘in crude terms, it is not possible both to hold more capital and to 
lend the same amount of money’. 
 Post-crisis debates about capital regulation were initially played-out in the context of 
international negotiations over Basel III. In September 2010 a draft agreement suggested raising core 
capital equity requirements from 2% of risk-weighted assets to 4.5% of such assets and tier 1 capital 
from 4% of risk-weighted assets to 6%, whilst also introducing a new mandatory capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5%, a discretionary counter-capital cyclical buffer of up to 2.5% and an overall leverage 
ratio of 3% of tier 1 capital relative to overall assets.  There is a rich literature on the politics and 
regulatory significance of Basel III. Baker (2013) presents Basel III as one part of a more general and 
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ambitious turn toward macroprudential financial regulation. Young (2012) points to the limited 
influence of financial interests upon the initial drafts of the Basel III agreement. The Financial Times 
columnist Martin Wolf (2010), on the other hand, described Basel III as the ‘mouse that did not roar’ 
(but see Wolf, 2014, 225-7 for a more nuanced account). Lall (2012, 609) shares Wolf’s scepticism: 
arguing that Basel III ‘falls far short of its creator’s aims’. Howarth and Quaglia (2013, 335) argue that 
the initial drafts of the Basel III agreement constituted a significant step-change in regulatory 
standards but also point to the way in which implementation of Basel III was delayed until 2019 after 
intense lobbying by the financial industry.  
The Bank of England, for its part, viewed Basel III as an improvement upon Basel II but as 
nevertheless inadequate. In October 2010 the Bank’s then Governor, Mervyn King (2010), publicly 
identified a number of deficiencies in the draft agreement and warned that ‘Basel III on its own will 
not prevent another crisis’. The Executive Director of Financial Stability at the Bank of England, Andy 
Haldane, subsequently told us that us that ‘it was a pretty open secret that [in relation to minimal 
capital ratios] we’d have preferred a number that was well North of where we came in’ (interview, 9th 
May 2013).  This argument about capital regulation intensified in 2011 when the European 
Commission released a draft of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV giving effect to Basel III. 
Attention in the UK focused upon provisions within CRD IV which significantly weakened the terms 
of Basel III by allowing banks to count the capital assets of insurance firm subsidiaries toward their 
overall capital requirements; by rolling-back the commitment within Basel III to introduce an overall 
(that is non-risk weighted) leverage ratio; and, above all, by introducing ‘maximum’ capital buffers to 
sit alongside Basel III’s minimal capital buffers (Howarth and Quaglia, 2013, 336-7). This final 
measure was defended as being necessary to ensure the effective maintenance of the single European 
market. The European Commission’s position was driven primarily by the German and French 
governments whose banks would have been most adversely affected by the full implementation of 
Basel III. The BBA (2012) had however also sought to exert pressure particularly in relation to the 
introduction of maximum harmonisation provisions. 
Garnering public support from the European Central Bank, the IMF and a plurality of 
European Finance Ministers, Bank of England officials publicly criticised the draft CRDIV agreement 
(Howarth and Quaglia, 2013, 340). On May the 2nd 2012 the UK rejected a compromise agreement 
which would have allowed member states to increase their capital buffers up to a specified threshold 
level. A deal was however eventually struck. The UK agreed to accept the provisions within CRD IV 
in relation to the counting of capital assets and the rolling-back of the commitment to introduce a 
European leverage ratio in return for an explicit agreement that no other country would challenge its 
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decisions to raise the capital buffers of UK banks. In effect, the UK secured an opt-out from maximum 
harmonisation. 
The Bank of England was prepared to fight hard on the issue of maximum harmonisation 
because, by this time, plans to overhaul the UK’s own regulatory framework and strengthen the 
authority of the Bank of England were already well advanced. The key moment here came in 2011 
with the publication of the White Paper A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger 
System in which the then Coalition Government confirmed that the FSA was to be abolished and 
replaced by two new bodies, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) and the Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA), both to be located within the Bank of England. The FPC has broad oversight of 
financial stability and systemic risk (HM Treasury, 2011, 7). The PRA is the ‘coal-face’ regulator 
responsible for the supervision of over 1,700 financial firms. The FPC was established in a shadow 
form in February 2011 prior to its formal statutory establishment in April 2013 and now holds the 
legal authority to set the countercyclical capital buffer introduced through Basel III; to set sectoral 
capital requirements; make ‘comply or explain’ recommendations to the PRA; and make 
recommendations to the Treasury on the setting of the boundary between regulated and non-
regulated financial activities (Tucker, Hall and Pattani, 2013, 195). 
The FPC and PRA have used their authority to further tighten regulatory standards in 
relation to capital. In his 2015 Mansion House speech, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark 
Carney (2015), told his audience that the ‘age of irresponsibility is over’ and pointed, amongst other 
things, to the way in which capital requirements have, in his words, been raised ‘ten-fold’ since the 
financial crisis. The FPC has pursued a regulatory agenda initially developed within the Financial 
Stability Board to require ‘systemically important’ global banks to hold an additional 3-5% of tier 1 
capital relative to risk-weighted assets. Second, the FPC has used stress-testing to assess the adequacy 
of capital buffers. Significantly, these tests have been much more demanding than those employed by 
the European Banking Authority (Bank of England, 2014a, 60-4). Third, the FPC has directed the PRA 
to scrutinise the risk-weights used by the banks in calculating their overall capital buffers. In March 
2013 UK banks were required to raise an additional £27bn in capital to compensate for deficiencies in 
risk-weights (FPC, 2013a, 3). Fourth, the FPC has introduced a leverage ratio for UK banks initially set 
at 3% of total non-risk-weighted assets (Bank of England, 2014b, 24). Finally, and in relation to 
concerns about consumer debt, the FPC has sought and been granted additional powers to directly 
limit mortgage lending (Bank of England, 2014a, 44-5). 
As a result of these moves, the overall ratio of core tier 1 equity to risk-weighted assets has 
risen from 7% at the end of 2011 to over 11%. This is 2% higher than the internationally agreed 
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benchmark for tier 1 capital within the Basel III agreement schedule to be fully implemented by 2019. 
The overall leverage ratio – measuring equity capital as a percentage of banks’ reported assets on an 
unweighted basis – is double the level it was in 2007 prior to the start of the financial crisis (Bank of 
England, 2015, 34-5). Between 2008 and 2015 UK banks have raised nearly £100bn in additional 
capital and disposed of £1.4 trillion in non-core assets – most notably trading assets - which has also 
had the effect of raising capital as a proportion of total assets (Bank of England, 2014a, 17). 
In late 2014 the banking industry renewed its campaign against bank regulation. The former 
Chairman of Barclays, Sir David Walker, argued that there is a ‘compelling and urgent’ need to 
review rules relating to the ring-fencing of investment and retail banking (Quinn, 2015). Standard 
Charter and HSBC have criticised the scope and scale of the bank levy on wholesale borrowing and, 
in doing so, have repeated their earlier threats to move abroad (Wright, 2015). The banks have had 
some successes. In his 2015 Mansion House address, Chancellor George Osborne (2015) signalled an 
end to ‘bank bashing’. Since then, the Chancellor has cut the size of the bank levy (balancing this with 
an additional tax on bank profits) and effectively sacked the Chair of a third regulatory body, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (Fortado and Arnold, 2015). Significantly however the UK’s 
comparatively stringent regulations on capital, leverage and risk-weighting have not been challenged 
and now appear to be a fixed part of the regulatory landscape. 
How Ideas Mattered 
The literature on state capacity focusses on the ability of a state to implement its policy agendas and 
emphasises bureaucratic expertise and state authority, as well as the nature of the state’s relationship 
with key social or economic interlocutors (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, 59-66; Evans, 1995; Cingolani, 
2013; Savoia and Kunal, 2012). However the literature does not focus on the role of ideas in shaping 
state capacity and in this section we argue that state capacity and the ability of state elites to 
withstand structural power threats can be enhanced by the very ideas and basic conceptions that state 
elites formulate and utilise (Bell 2012). 
In the pre-crisis period banks lobbied for and were awarded lower capital requirements. 
Since then, capital standards have been significantly tightened despite sustained opposition from the 
banks. We cannot easily explain this in terms of shifts in the banking sector’s size or economic 
significance. Jobs have been lost in the City since 2008 but CityUK (2015) estimates that banking and 
finance and related professional services still employ 7% of the UK workforce and accounts for 12% of 
total output. Ministers remain unambiguously committed to the City as a global financial centre (Bell 
and Hindmoor, 2014c, 351). It is true that, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, bond and equity 
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markets became a more important source of finance for business investment relative to bank loans 
(Pattani, and Vera, 2011, 319). Yet a clear majority of business investment is still funded through bank 
loans (Farrant, Inkinen, Rutkowska, and Theodoridis, 2013). It is not the bank’s changing role in the 
economy but the ideational and institutional environment in which banks operate that has weakened 
their structural power.  
In the aftermath of the crisis the banks argued that raising capital would increase costs, cut 
lending and harm the economy. This argument acquired political traction because bank lending was 
viewed as being vital to economic recovery. The then Business Secretary, Lord Mandelson (2010), 
warned that: ‘as the recovery strengthens, we must avoid banks shrinking their balance sheets to meet 
regulatory requirements at the expense of lending to the viable businesses that we need to drive the 
recovery’. Prior to the 2010 general election, George Osborne (2010) warned that regulators were 
showing ‘too little consideration of the impact of higher capital and liquidity requirements on overall 
financial conditions and the pace of recovery’. Once in office, Osborne continued to express concern 
that excessive bank regulation could result in the ‘stability of the graveyard’ (Armistead, 2011). In a 
review of business lending the CBI (2012, 12) – which has generally been critical of the supply of 
lending to small and medium-sizes businesses – nevertheless endorsed the banking sector’s 
arguments: maintaining that ‘increases [in] the level of capital banks are required to hold, increase the 
costs to banks of lending to businesses’.  
Since around 2011 however the banks’ arguments about the relationship between capital and 
lending have been successfully challenged by officials within the Bank of England and by academic 
economists. Significantly, the banks describe capital as a reserve which must be set aside to cover 
potential future losses. Higher capital requirements, they argue, mean that more money must be set 
aside which means less money for loans. However, in November 2011 the FPC’s Robert Jenkins (2011) 
described such arguments as being ‘intellectually dishonest’ and intended to exploit common 
‘misunderstanding and fear’. In contrast to the bank’s arguments, Bank of England officials argue that 
capital is not a reserve but a source of funding, just like deposits or other forms of bank borrowing. In 
order to lend to business, banks must first raise money. They can do so this by collecting deposits, 
raising funds on capital markets or borrowing on wholesale funding markets. Banks can, all else 
being equal, actually increase the amount of funds they have available to lend by raising additional 
capital. Hence capital is not a ‘reserve’. Its key importance is that it serves as a buffer if and when 
losses are incurred on the asset side of the balance sheet. As the PRA’s Chief Executive, Andrew 
Bailey (2013) argues: ‘Equity capital is not money that has to be stashed away for a rainy day and thus 
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put to no good use. It is the shareholders’ stake in the company …. Equity finances the provision of 
loans to households and companies, and those loans are the bank’s assets’.   
The banks however argue that equity is more expensive than debt. To raise capital banks 
must pay dividends and offer a return on equity. To get wholesale loans, banks must pay interest and 
reassure lenders they will not default. Banks argue that interest on wholesale funds is less than the 
cost of new capital and that - therefore - raising minimal capital requirements raises their overall 
costs: requiring them to charge higher interest rates on loans and so depressing lending.  
 Bank of England officials have responded by arguing that equity is only more expensive than 
debt because banks are perceived as being ‘too big to fail’. When deciding what interest to charge on a 
loan, lenders factor in default or insolvency risk and demand an interest-rate premium if risk is high. 
The more likely a company is thought to default, the higher this premium. Yet banks partly escape 
this logic because lenders believe that banks will be bailed-out by the authorities in a crisis. Hence 
banks have pay a lower interest rate in order to borrow money than non-financial companies. Capital 
is not inherently more expensive than debt (all else being equal), but the cost of debt in a ‘too big to 
fail’ world has been artificially deflated by a hidden subsidy in the form of state support (Haldane, 
2012). Nevertheless, using the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem, Bank of England economists and 
officials suggest that, in so far as equity is indeed relatively more expensive than debt, this is also 
because banks currently hold so little loss-absorbing capital. Low capital encourages equity investors 
to assume that relatively small losses will threaten their investment, leading to demands for higher 
returns for their investment (Haldane, 2010, Tucker, 2013). This reverses the causal logic of the bank’s 
arguments about the relationship between capital and lending. It is low capital levels which 
jeopardise bank lending by weakening investor confidence, thus making it more expensive for banks 
to raise additional funds through either equity or wholesale funding markets. According to Mervyn 
King (2013)  
those who argue that requiring higher levels of capital will necessarily restrict lending are 
wrong. The reverse is true. It is insufficient capital that restricts lending. That is why some of 
our weaker banks are shrinking their balance sheets. Capital supports lending and provides 
resilience. And, without a resilient banking system, it will be difficult to sustain a recovery. 
The Bank’s arguments about the relationship between capital and lending have proven highly 
influential. They have been echoed and extended in a widely-reviewed book on bank regulation by 
the economists Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig (2013; also see Admati, 2013; and Wolf, 2013 and the 
Economist, 2013 for reviews). Since 2012 they have also been taken-up by Government Ministers, most 
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notably the Conservative MP and Financial Secretary to the Treasury Mark Hoban (2012) and by the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking (2013a, 191). On the other hand, in 2013 the Liberal Democrat 
Business Secretary Vince Cable publicly decried the ‘capital Taliban’ within the Bank of England 
(Parker, Goff and Rigby, 2013) whilst the media reaction to the introduction of the FPC’s leverage 
ratio emphasised the possible knock-on effects on mortgage rates (Boyce, 2014; Titcomb, 2014). It is 
nevertheless the case that the balance of the debate about the relationship between capital and 
lending has significantly changed as a result of the Bank of England’s intervention. Perhaps more 
tellingly the banks themselves – in their evidence to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
(British Bankers Association, 2012a; Barclays, 2012 and Lloyds Banking Group, 2012),  in response to 
the requirement to raise an additional £27bn in capital in 2013 (BBA, 2013) and in response to the 
introduction of a leverage ratio (BBA, 2014) – have stopped arguing that raising capital requirements 
will reduce lending. The banks continue to argue that regulation must be calibrated in such a way as 
to ensure that lending remains profitable. They have stopped arguing however that lending is 
constrained by capital regulations. 
 The often highly technical debate about the relationship between capital and lending should 
also be seen within a broader ideational context. As historians of political thought (Skinner, 2002) and 
discursive institutionalists (Schmidt, 2008) have emphasised, ideas are connected: changes in one idea 
can lead to changes in other ideas. Prior to 2008, regulator’s views about capital were complemented 
and reinforced by the conviction that financial markets were efficient; that rising asset prices reflected 
economic fundamentals; that banks could effectively manage risk; that credit rating agencies knew 
what they were doing; that securitisation and credit default swaps had distributed risk; and that 
banks would always be able to maintain solvency by selling assets and borrowing money in liquid 
funding markets (see Bell and Hindmoor, 2015).  
 The crisis repudiated all of these ideas. It produced a ‘fairly complete train wreck of [the] 
predominant theory of economics and finance’ (Turner, 2009b) and demanded a ‘fundamental 
reconsideration of financial regulation’ (Goodhart, 2010, 73). The Bank of England has, in this context, 
embraced not only  much higher capital levels but a new macroprudential regulatory agenda which 
recognises the possibility of irrational exuberance, asset bubbles, systemic risk, poorly aligned 
incentive structures and unpredictable cascades of defaults and market failures (FPC, 2014; Tucker, 
Hall and Pattani, 2013; Kohn, 2013; Tucker, 2013; Baker 2013). Officials now operate explicitly on an 
assumption that it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate entirely the possibility of a bank 
failing and that higher minimal capital requirements are needed to ensure that the costs of any 
subsequent failure do not fall on the taxpayer (Carney, 2013). This revised ideational context has been 
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central in helping guide and empower policymakers and has provided incentives to face down the 
banks’ opposition to higher capital requirements. Policymakers have arrived at a more critical 
reappraisal of the stability of financial markets and the competence of banks and asserted their own 
policy agenda. The initial attempts by the banks to exert structural power by threatening to reduce 
credit were weakened as policymakers revised their ideas. 
The Institutional Mediation of Structural Power 
In this section we continue our analysis of state capacity. In cases where cooperative relations with 
external or societal interests cannot easily be established or maintained, a degree of state insulation 
from such interests may be required in order to enhance state capacity. In other cases of conflict, overt 
confrontation with external interests may well reflect and enhance state capacity. Indeed, 
Emmenegger (2015) has shown how certain forms of state authority may be used to exert structural 
power over business interests by threatening their economic position. In this case however, we argue 
that bureaucratic insulation was important in enhancing state capacity and the ability of state elites to 
face down structural power threats. 
In a classic expression of structural power, banks threatened that higher capital levels would 
jeopardise lending and harm the economy. This argument, as we have seen, was subsequently and 
effectively challenged by the Bank of England. Ideas alone cannot however fully explain this change. 
Institutions in the shape of rules and resources which both constrain and enable behaviour also 
matter (Bell 2011). If power is ideationally mediated then the marketplace of ideas is also 
institutionally mediated. Certain institutional venues privilege certain interests and, with those 
interests, certain ideas. As Ward (1987, 595) observed some time ago in relation to the City of 
London’s then traditionally close relationship with the Bank of England, ‘structural power may result 
from organisational structures within the state which are partially sustained through links with a 
certain industry’. But this can also work the other way. Structural power can also be challenged by 
organisational structures within the state due to the latter’s institutional capacities. In the case of 
hostile relations with key social interlocutors, bureaucratic insulation can enhance state capacity. 
As we have argued, a key moment in the development of post-crisis capital regulations came 
with the establishment of the FPC within the Bank of England in shadow form in 2011. In the 
immediate post-crisis period the Bank of England was constrained by the need to negotiate 
agreements with other central banks (in relation to the Basel III negotiations) and with members of 
the European Union (in relation to CRDIV) and draft proposals relating to maximum harmonisation. 
As we have seen, the Bank also had to contend with politicians who were, at least initially, persuaded 
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by the banks’ arguments that increasing capital requirements would result in less lending. Scott James 
(forthcoming, 13; and references therein) argues that the Bank, during this period, also encountered 
opposition from the UK Treasury which sympathised with arguments about maximum 
harmonisation. Yet the Bank of England was far from powerless in these struggles. Bank officials 
occupied influential international positions during the Basel III negotiations. Paul Tucker, a Deputy 
Governor, chaired the Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, whilst Lord Turner, the 
Chairman of the FSA, chaired the Financial Stability Board’s Standing Committee on Supervisory and 
Regulatory Cooperation. During the dispute over CRDIV, Scott James (forthcoming, 19) argues that 
the Bank of England was able to hold the ‘Treasury’s feet to the fire’ by publicly and steadfastly 
underlining its opposition to maximum harmonisation.  
The Bank of England has also been helped by public interest in and hostility toward the banks. 
Prior to 2008 discussions about bank regulation were confined to a ‘quiet’ (Culpepper, 2011) world in 
which regulatory debates took place well beyond the public gaze in an environment in which the 
supposedly expert judgements, technical acumen and market efficiency of bankers were largely 
accepted by the authorities (Bell and Hindmoor, 2014b). During this period, the British banking 
system was lauded by politicians - most notably Gordon Brown in his 2007 Mansion House Speech 
(Brown, 2007) -  as the engine of Britain’s economic renaissance. The 2008 crisis changed everything. 
As The Economist (2009) observed: ‘whilst economists continue to debate the ultimate causes of the 
collapse of the financial crisis … the public and most politicians, however, are clear: the blame lies 
with bankers, venal and incompetent in equal measure’. Once the Coalition was elected in 2010 the 
key question of whether to break-up the largest banks was handed to the technocratic Independent 
Commission on Banking (Bell and Hindmoor, 2014b). Over the next few years, the banks, including 
Barclays’ Chief Executive, Bob Diamond, made periodic efforts to persuade the public that the ‘time 
for banker remorse is over’ (Wilson and Armistead, 2011). These efforts were compromised by the 
fact that, at this stage, bank lending was still contracting; by the ongoing reputational costs of 
inquiries into and compensation for the banks’ miss-selling of Payment Protection Insurance; by 
HSBC’s involvement in the laundering of drug money in Mexico; and, above all, by the LIBOR 
scandal which broke in May 2012 and shattered the banks’ efforts to persuade the public and 
politicians that they had changed. One immediate result of the LIBOR scandal was the establishment 
of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards which, through a series of reports, public 
hearings and interventions into policy debates (most notably into the ‘electrification’ of the ring-fence 
proposed by the Independent Commission on Banking) kept the banking industry in the headlines 
and on the defensive. 
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One consequence of the continued politicisation of banking was that technical debates about 
capital buffers and risk-weighting took place in a noisy environment in which the media and the 
public were predisposed to question the banks’ honesty and competence. In Australia in 2010 the 
mining industry was able to derail proposals for a new profit tax by publicly arguing that new taxes 
would cut investment and employment. The mining industry was certainly helped by the fact that it 
could afford to saturate the airwaves with its advertisements. But it was also successful because the 
public had a generally favourable image of the industry as the guardians of Australia’s prosperity 
and so believed their arguments (Bell and Hindmoor, 2014a). Following the financial crisis, the banks 
in Britain were not operating in nearly as favourable a political environment.  
 
The establishment of the FPC was nevertheless an important moment because it enhanced the 
institutional authority of the very officials who were challenging the banks’ arguments about the 
relationship between capital and lending. Three specific institutional attributes of the FPC have 
strengthened its position. First, the FPC has a relatively clear mandate: identifying, monitoring, 
reducing and removing sources of systemic risk, arising from ‘structural features of financial 
markets’, the ‘distribution of risk within the financial sector’ and ‘unsustainable levels of leverage, 
debt or credit’ (Tucker, Hall and Pattani, 2013, 193). This remit has been somewhat complicated by the 
Treasury’s insistence that the FPC not act in ways that would ‘have a significant adverse effect on the 
capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy’ (Barwell, 2013, 87). 
This reflects Chancellor Osborne’s above-noted concern about the financial ‘stability of the 
graveyard’. Yet there is no evidence that the FPC views this requirement as an impediment, largely 
because it sees financial stability is an essential perquisite for growth (Haldane, 2011b, FPC, 2014, 6). 
In a demonstration of the importance not only of institutional rules but of ideas, the FPC has 
concluded that its mandate is an unambiguously simple one which provides it with a clear 
responsibility to challenge the interests of the banks if needed.   
Second, The FPC has been granted a great deal of autonomy not only from the European 
Commission, but also from both the UK government and the banks. The government has confirmed 
that the FPC’s ‘members need to be, and be seen to be, independent of government and other 
influences’ (FPC, 2013b, 3). As Haldane described it, the FPC is a ‘technocratic [body] put at arm's 
length from the political process, which is a lesson we sort of learnt from monetary policy … it helps a 
lot if you can be at arm's length from the electorate, or from the political process more generally’ 
(interview, 9th May 2013). The FPC is thus only obliged to explain to the Chancellor how its decisions 
promote medium and long-term economic growth (HM Treasury, 2011, 20). The Government has no 
institutional authority to question these explanations or veto policy proposals. Given the historically 
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close relationship between the major parties and the City, this political autonomy is an important new 
source of institutional capacity. The FPC’s autonomy is also reflected in the fact that it is not required 
to consult with the banking sector. The FPC includes a voting minority of four outside members: 
currently (as of September 2015) Clara Furse, the former Chief Executive of the London Stock 
Exchange; Donald Kohn, a Former Vice Chairman of the US Federal Reserve and Member of the Bank 
of England Board of Governors; Richard Sharp, a former Chairman of Goldman Sachs’ European 
Principal Investments; and Martin Taylor, a former Chairman of the agro-chemical firm Syngenta AG 
and an advisor to Goldman Sachs. There is no evidence however that those external members have 
articulated the interests of UK banks in lobbying for lower capital. Indeed one of the former external 
members of the Committee, Robert Jenkins (2011), who, in his own words, was a ‘former lobbyist for 
the investment industry’, has, as we have seen, publicly denounced the banks’ arguments about the 
impact of raising capital buffers on lending. 
Finally, the Bank of England and its coal-face regulator, the PRA, has been given sufficient 
staff and resources to develop their own research capacity. Although senior regulators in the US have 
complained about a lack of resources and staff (Walter 2013), in the UK, by contrast, the Bank of 
England has benefited from significant investment; reflecting a new view that prior to the crisis the 
FSA and regulators had been starved of resources (Parliamentary Commission on Banking, 2013b, 25-
8). The total number of staff increased from 1,900 in 2009 to 3,600 in 2014 (Bank of England, 2014c, 1). 
Prior to the crisis the Bank focussed on inflation (Irwin, 2013, 122), but it now employs seven 
economists who specialise in banking crises; nine who work on asset pricing; twenty on banking and 
financial investment; twenty-four on financial markets; six on financial stability policy; and six who 
work on risk management (Bank of England, 2014d).  
 On this basis the Bank has challenged the structural power of the banks, both though an 
ideational shift and through an enhancement of institutional authority and capacity. These are linked: 
the extension of the institutional authority of the Bank should be explained as the result of post-crisis 
lesson-learning by its officials, by ministers and by advisory bodies like the Turner Report (2009a) the 
Independent Commission on Banking (2011), and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking (2013a). 
First, the location of the FPC within the Bank of England has been informed by arguments that the 
pre-crisis ‘tripartite’ arrangements in which responsibility for financial regulation was shared 
between the FSA, The Treasury and the Bank of England were inadequate and resulted in a delayed 
and confused response to the Northern Rock Crisis (see Treasury Select Committee, 2010 for a 
summary). Second, the granting of a clear mandate to the FPC has been informed by arguments that 
the pre-crisis FSA was hamstrung by a requirement imposed upon it within the 2000 Financial 
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Services and Markets Act to seek financial stability whilst also ‘maintaining market confidence’ and 
the ‘competitive position of the United Kingdom’ in relation to finance (Financial Services and 
Markets Act, 2000). Finally, the FPC’s institutional autonomy from government and industry 
lobbyists reflects a widespread view that the FSA had been too close to the industry it was regulating 
and that Downing Street and the Treasury had been too ready to intervene when the banks had 
complained about over-regulation (FSA, 2011, 29; Engelen et al. (2011, 10)  
Conclusion 
 
Scholars are slowly gaining a clearer understanding of the variables that shape the structural power 
of business interests. We have moved a large distance from early, purely structural accounts featuring 
the automatic nature of the power of business. A number of intervening structural and institutional 
variables have been added to accounts which now show how structural power might vary or change. 
More recently there have been accounts which explicitly highlight agency, especially the role of 
political leaders and how they use ideas to appraise and even re-assess structural power threats (Bell 
2013; Bell and Hindmoor 2014b). There have also been accounts which bring in the electorate, 
showing how electoral perceptions about structural power and disinvestment threats can alter the 
calculations of political leaders and how they respond to business threats (Bell and Hindmoor, 2014a). 
This paper has extended this focus on agency, showing how the ideas of policy officials played a key 
role in defusing structural power threats made by banks in the UK about the costs and economic 
implications of higher bank capital levels. The paper also showed that arguments regarding state 
capacity and the institutional resources and insulation of key officials can be important in aiding 
officials in advancing and sustaining their ideas in confrontations with business interests.  
 
 Empirically this paper illustrates the significance of national policy arenas in financial 
regulation and the step-change in UK capital buffers following the establishment of the FPC. A 
number of commentators have argued that the post-crisis politics of bank reform has essentially failed 
(Mirowski, 2013; Wolf, 2014), with Helleiner (2014) referring to a ‘status quo crisis.’ Similarly, Johal, 
Moran and Williams (2012) argue ‘the financial elite [in the UK] has been able to use its lobbying and 
financial muscle to shape [post-crisis] institutional arrangements and to elaborate a dominant 
regulatory ideology’ (see Johal, Moran and Williams, 2014 for a more detailed elaboration). It is true 
that Basel III and CRD IV regulations have been widely criticised. Nonetheless in the UK, we have 
argued that significant reform has occurred and that the regulatory landscape now looks very 
different. This is not to suggest that the banking system is now safe or that regulatory reform has been 
sufficient. Indeed we have previously expressed concerns that regulators are in danger of ‘winning 
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battles but losing the war over bank reform’ in as much as banks retain the incentive and capacity to 
try to evade regulatory rules through financial innovation and by transferring risk to the shadow 
banking sector (Bell and Hindmoor, 2014c). Yet it is clear that, as a result of changes in the ideational 
and institutional environment, significant changes in capital regulation have occurred since the 2008 
crisis and that, within this arena, the structural power of the banks has been challenged. As Andy 
Haldane (2014) suggests, since 2008, the Bank of England’s thinking in relation to regulation in 
general and on capital in particular has gone through an ‘elegant 180 degree shift’. 
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